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Introduction.
Our research question is How is power exercised and conflict managed within committees? We shall take
an "argumentational" approach to this question by considering the relationship between the
argumentation elements (claims, premises, warrants, politeness, topic choice and so on) and power and
conflict. Examples of the type of question this approach will stimulate are How is power expressed in how
people argue with each other in committees? Is power very obvious, and does it constrain what people
say and how they say it? How is conflict managed and how does this relate to the process of
argumentation?
The precise relationship between the argumentation of a committee and the generation of commitment
and acceptance is not yet known. We still do not know what methods are used in meetings to maintain a
cooperative atmosphere (and what constraints this places on what can be argued), what politeness and
cooperativeness routines are used to protect individuals from losing face, how much of the argumention is
explicit or whether explicitness risks an unacceptable visibility for the loser, and whether there are
linguistic or behavioural signs which warn participants when conflict is approaching.
Also, the concept of power within committees is confused. There are several potential definitions of
power, but there is no means within the literature of identifying which definition is most appropriate to
committees. We will seek to distinguish the various extant definitions of power to committees, to develop
a definition of our own which derives from language, and to relate this to the extant definitions.
Research on committees.
This section will introduce several strands of research which come together to make up this field.
Conflict in committees. Conflict is one of the problems of committees (Vroom, 1973), requiring more
complex interpersonal relationships than dyadic relationships (Bazerman et al., 1988) and often causing
members to feel compelled to comply with majority decisions, or to shift their own positions to be more in
line with the group’s position (Burnstein, 1983). Conflict is associated with ambiguity in five of
McCaskey’s (1982) 12 characteristics of ambiguous situations and it is problems of conflict that
"encourage ... unwillingness to risk embarrassment by disagreeing with superiors, reluctance to admit that
one has no idea what is going on" (Weick, 1995: 186). Moreover, conflict is implicit in Weick’s (1995: 92)
more specific concept of equivocality – the property of having more than one meaning. When conflict is
avoided by means of committees becoming highly cohesive, there is the problem of "groupthink" , which
is "a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement that results from in-group
pressures" (Janis, 1972: 9). Moreover, the desire to avoid conflict leads members of committees to the
view that they agree when they do not, which has been called the "false consensus" bias (Ross et al.,
1977). On the other hand, when there is conflict, discussion may result in decisions which are the product
of excessive compromise (a problem which is aggravated by a requirement of unanimity), logrolling, and
one-person or minority domination (Luthans, 1992: 357). Conflict has been found to take a large part of a
manager’s role (Mintzberg, 1973) and working time (Thomas & Schmidt, 1976). A major task in conflict
management is how to transform destructive, competitive conflict into constructive, cooperative conflict by
means of integrating both sides’ points of view and avoiding sacrifices, blame, and loss of face (Follett,
1924). Although it is known that compromise and smoothing are associated with reduced conflict and that
forcing and withdrawal are associated with raised conflict (Thamhain & Wilemon, 1974) it is not known
forcing and withdrawal are associated with raised conflict (Thamhain & Wilemon, 1974) it is not known
how this is achieved in committees and how this relates to power. Interactive meetings are highly valued
for the reason that subordinates are far more likely to accept a leader’s decision following an interactive
group process regardless of either the leader’s desire to reach consensus or the technical quality of the
decision (Ettling & Jago, 1988).
The question of conflict management is therefore closely related to the question of how power is
exercised in committees. Disagreements about cause-effect relationships and objectives lead to conflict
and to the greater use of power (Pfeffer, 1981). Debate in committees involves an agreement to engage
in exchange. The agreement is that although a person has the right to have his argumention weighed, he
must also weigh the arguments of others. This is potentially an uncontrollable process for any leader, who
is concerned about the time the process may take (even postponement and delay), at the conflicts that
may be generated, and at the possibility that a decision may be taken which he does not favour. Although
the social psychology literature suggests that open conflict can be functional and valuable (Barker et al.,
1988), these studies often collect their data at some remove from strategic committees of large
organisations.
Power in committees. Any consideration of the role of power in, and management control of
committees, depends on which of the many different definitions of power one chooses. Therefore we shall
develop a typology of power with which to evaluate the role of committees and the relevance of power in
them. The five definitions of power each have something to add to our understanding of committee power.
A ‘zero sum’ definition of power (Clegg, 1989; Fincham, 1992) equates power with winning or losing
argumentation within committees. It regards political conflict as a fight between individuals over an object,
and the ability to overcome resistance (Krackhardt, 1990; Pfeffer, 1992). Individuals do occasionally
become embroiled in dispassionate debate or heated argumention in committees. But such occasions
are rare: if the zero sum definition of power were always applicable to committees, then committees
would be the focus of intense conflict and would have an organisationally damaging effect.
A ‘processual’ definition of power regards power as a social relationship (Orlikowski, 1989; Pettigrew,
1973) rather than as an attribute of a person and is defined in positive sum terms as getting the best out
of the committee. The relationship involves an exchange of a reward, a punishment, a right, an identity, or
expertise (French & Raven, 1968). The exchange is a resource-dependency one where the "dependence
of Actor A upon Actor B is (1) directly proportional to A’s motivational investment in goals mediated by B
and (2) inversely proportional to the availability of these goals to A outside the A-B relations" (Emerson,
1962: 32; see also Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Were the benefits of argumentation to be considered to
outweigh the disadvantages, the processual definition would always be relevant in advocating open and
exhaustive discussion in committees, and there would be elaborate chains of argumentation of attacking
and supporting claims. However, committee leaders have reason to be ambivalent toward argumentation.
This is because argumentation, besides having advantages, is also time consuming, conducive to
conflict, and uncertain in its effects.
An ‘organizational’ definition of power is one which ascribes power to committee members who can
effectively play their roles to utilise resources and knowledge. Hierarchical status and task
interdependence (Crozier, 1964) are two examples of this. The relevance of the organisational definition
of power in committees is that each committee member will make contributions determined by her role
within the organisation. Knowledge of how other members’ organisational roles influence what they want
increases a committee member’s power (Krackhardt, 1990). The persuasiveness of argumentation
depends upon the values and goals of the audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969) which in an
organisation become internalised as those of the organisation (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985: 188-189),
which requires the individual’s identification with the organisation (Cheney, 1983).
A ‘structurally constrained’ definition of power has concerned itself with how the goals and assumptions of
the powerful or the powerless operate at a super-organizational level, including class perceptions and
ideologies (Willmott, 1987), and occupational rhetorics (Fine, 1996). Power is the ability to understand,
use and become independent of these background factors which constrain one’s attitudes and
motivations. An application of the structurally constrained definition to committees suggests that power is
the ability of committee members to take up goals, concepts and assumptions from the wider society
which will help them to solve problems.
A ‘social construction’ definition takes as its starting point the observation that reality is subjective and
therefore able to be created through language (Berger & Luckman, 1971). Because language has both
tacit (taken for granted and thus unproblematic) and explicit (chosen as foreground and thus problematic)
meanings, the purpose of social and political activity such as committee work is to translate the
problematic into the unproblematic and taken for granted (Berger & Luckmann, 1971; Callon, 1986;
Latour, 1987). Power is the ability to make things become taken for granted. Organisations achieve this
by means of institutionalisation, a process in which an important element is the creation of legitimacy by
various means (Weber, 1947). The social construction definition of power is prescriptive about the
desirability of decision closure (Berger & Luckmann, 1971), of long term project survival (Law & Callon,
1992), and the undesirability of suppressing criticism (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985).
Communication in groups. This work has focussed on the inter-personal dynamics and social
psychological processes of group interaction, and began with the book "How we think" (Dewey, 1910)
which put forward a method of reflective thinking as part of a pedagogical perspective – with objectives
such as how to speak effectively to an audience, how to effectively consider issues and how best to solve
problems in groups. Another perspective on committee effectiveness was to use the analogy of human
personality applied to the group – as in Cattell’s (1948) notion of effective synergy of a group, which was
the residual when the amount of energy devoted to the group’s maintenance is subtracted from the total
amount of energy able to be given to a task. Later researchers were to see relational factors of groups in
a positive as well as a negative light (Salazar, 1995). These and other concerns formed the background to
the start of empirical research on individual and group effectiveness, in particular concentrating on critical
thinking ability, the beneficial use of meeting agendas (such as the Standard Agenda – Phillips, 1966),
and the effect of members’ personalities on group processes. This gave rise to two avenues of research –
the functional and the developmental (Gouran, 1998). The functional approach considered the ways in
which utterances aid the performance of tasks and found partial evidence for the view that those who
exhibit the patterns of thought identified by Dewey contribute to better group outcomes and exert more
influence on other group members (Sharp & Milliken, 1964), whereas the developmental approach
considered the sequential dependencies of utterances in groups. An example of this latter approach was
a study by Bales & Strodtbeck (1951) which suggested that there is a recurrent chronological pattern of
interaction in problem-solving groups which they called orientation, evaluation and control. Scheidel &
Crowell (1964) however found that discussion does not unfold in a linear fashion but instead is processual
and system-like, dependent not only on previous utterances suggested by Bales & Strodtbeck but also
upon the elements which constitute the group and those which derive from the external environment.
Another criticism of the linear model was provided by Poole (1983) who showed that multiple sequence
models (which posit that there are several parallel and semi-related sequences) are more accurate
descriptions of group interaction.
The functional approach was considerably extended by Hirokawa (1980) and Gouran (1985, 1988) who
attempted to find communication-based reasons for differences in the performance of decision-making
groups. Their basic theory was that groups have a greater likelihood of high performance when they use
communication which serves task requirements and which generally conforms to the prescriptions laid
down by Dewey’s (1910) model of reflective critical thinking. However, although later research partly
supported this view, (in particular successfully illuminating failures of decision making groups such as
supported this view, (in particular successfully illuminating failures of decision making groups such as
those deliberating in the Watergate and Challenger cases – Gouran, 1984; Gouran et al., 1986) there was
insufficient attention to the question of whether communication supports task requirements or merely
appears to do so.
More recently, structuration theory has been very influential in driving a number of important studies of
group interaction. For example, structural elements shown to be both modified by and an influence on
group discussion have included critical events (Fisher & Stutman, 1987) and discussion formats
(Hirokawa, 1985). These structural elements were defined by Poole et al., (1996) as rules and resources.
An original and provocative study by Hewes (1979) questioned the discipline’s basic assumptions such
as that what is said at one moment influences what is said later (rather than coming as a series of
discrete contributions), and that interaction within groups determines outcomes (rather than decisions
being made prior to meetings). This led to a theory (Hewes, 1986) that decisions are determined by
prediscussion preferences of group members. This was partly vindicated by research by Scheerhorn et
al., (1994) who showed that information dissemination is a far more important communicative act in
groups than decision making, and by criticisms by Canary et al., (1995) and Zey (1992) (building on
earlier criticisms by Simon (1978) and Cohen et al., (1972)) of the rational choice model of groups
espoused by the functionalist tradition of research.
Persuasion. In contrast to the literature on group communication which has concentrated upon interaction
and effectiveness, the persuasion literature derives from psychology and social psychology and
concentrates on the attributes of sender and receiver of messages which effect a change in attitude.
However, a point of overlap between the two literatures has been the issue of inattention to Dewey’s
prescriptive model of effective committee functioning and the reasons why this model is so seldom
followed. Of relevance here is the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion which suggests that
receivers will engage in "elaboration" of information relevant to the persuasive issue and that people vary
between two extreme behaviours - they may either engage in extensive issue-relevant thinking during
argumentation (the so-called "central route" to persuasion – Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), or they may rely on
a simple heuristic (e.g. by the credibility of the arguer - Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1986, or the extent to
which other people are persuaded - Axsom et al., 1987, or the likeability of the arguer - Petty & Cacoppio
1986) – the so-called "peripheral route" to persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). It is known that issue-
relevant thinking increases when the topic is relevant to the individual (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984) when the
individual knows more about the issue (Wood & Kallgren, 1988), and when the individual enjoys thinking
(Hangtvedt et al., 1988), all conditions which may be increased when frequent and open debate is
encouraged within a committee. Left to their own devices people will be "intuitive, lazy and impulsive,
swayed this way and that by their attitudes, prejudices, and pieties", (Willard, 1989a: 183) whereas
argumentation "quality can matter, does matter" (O’Keefe, 1995: 9).
Another point of contact between the two fields is the theory (Hewes, 1986) that decisions are determined
by prediscussion preferences of group members rather than by the discussion itself. The persuasion
literature on social judgement theory (Sherif et al., 1965) suggests that our reaction to a particular
persuasive communication will depend on what we think of (how favourable we are toward) the point of
view it advocates. More particularly, the theory suggests that a communication advocating a position that
falls in the receiver’s latitude of acceptance is likely to be assimilated (perceived as closer to the
receiver’s own view), and a communication advocating a position in the latitude of rejection will probably
be contrasted (perceived as even more discrepant from the receiver’s own view). The theory explains the
political use of ambiguity in terms of an attempt to make political candidates’ views seem the same as the
voter’s and thus to encourage assimilation effects. This may be relevant to voting behaviour but it cannot
explain the action of persuading someone to alter his opinion. Moreover, "everything turns simply on what
position the message is seen to defend. And surely this is an incomplete account of what underlies
position the message is seen to defend. And surely this is an incomplete account of what underlies
persuasive message effects" (O’Keefe, 1990: 43).
Another very relevant area has been the degree of susceptibility and resistance of receivers to different
types of persuasion. Marwell & Schmidt (1967) for example, identified 16 compliance-gaining strategies
such as promises and threats which capitalise on these susceptibilities, and McLoughlin et al., (1980)
suggested various ways in which people resist compliance-gaining strategies. As yet no work has been
done relating this type of research to committees.
Research which has related persuasion to management has tended to take the organisation rather than
the committee as the unit of analysis. One way to relate persuasion to specific contexts within
organisations is to explore the inter-relationship between roles and rules. For instance, Reardon-Boynton
& Fairhurst (1978) used a socialisation perspective to show that individuals justify their messages by
means of rules provided by others when they communicate with superiors or subordinates, but that they
create their own rules when dealing with peers. This would suggest that committees of peers will be more
creative and less conventional than committees whose members vary widely in organisational status.
Also, bosses who provide subordinates with accounts and excuses for refusing a request often mitigate
conflict-inducing responses from them (Bies et al., 1988).
Argumentation. What is meant by an argumentational approach and what is distinctive about it? In
essence argumentation is an umbrella term referring to a range of intellectual developments concerned
with understanding the way in which language is employed in the context of justifying a conclusion based
on evidence (Toulmin, 1958). It is distinctive because it examines the logical structure of what people say
to each other rather than considering attributes of the sender and of the receiver (the persuasion
approach), or of the group interaction (the group communication approach). The next section will introduce
the argumentation literature, and the following section will illustrate how this approach can be used to
understand power and conflict in committees.
Following van Eemeren et al., (1994): the aims and objectives of the field of argumentation can be
characterized as: (1) At a prescriptive level, to develop principles which inform people how to argue well.
(2) At a descriptive level, to model the processes of argumention underpinning such phenomena as
setting and shifting a topic, holding the floor in conversation and negotiating social identities. (3) At a
normative level, to develop a framework in order to evaluate and improve collective real-world
argumentative practices, treating the practices both as phenomena to be explained and as opportunities
for intervention, in order to bring about social and organizational change.
How to argue well involves answering the question of what makes argumention strong. Argumention
strength is a composite of many dimensions which tend to operate in a heuristic, satisficing way (Taylor &
Fiske, 1991; Dudszak, 1991). These dimensions include relevance, truth and effectiveness (Hample &
Dallinger, 1990), acceptability and sufficiency, (Johnson, 1994: 241), logicality, emotionality, and
ethicality, (Gass et al., 1990), and precedent, authority, likeliness, plausibility and ‘obviousness’
(McCloskey, 1983).
However, such dimensions are socially constructed. Investigations of the concepts of ‘argument field’
(Willard, 1989b) and ‘organizational logic’ (McPhee, 1988) suggest that rationality will be at best local,
dependent on context (Keogh, 1988: 3; Toulmin, 1958: 14; Willihnganz, 1994: 924-6). This means that
criteria for judging what is a strong argumention may vary with context and circumstances (McEvoy, 1994:
54). The context may not only be defined by membership but also by intentionality (Habermas, 1987).
Toulmin (1958: 103) has provided the basic model of argumentation, whose elements comprise premise
(evidence) e.g. "Low share price and large assets", claim (conclusion) e.g. "the company is ripe for
takeover" and the warrant which justifies using the premise to make the claim e.g. "this worked in the
takeover" and the warrant which justifies using the premise to make the claim e.g. "this worked in the
past". Claims may be accompanied by a qualifier such as "usually". A qualifier may have attached to it
some exceptions to the rule.
Everyday argumentation within organisations and committees is socially situated - warrants, claims and
premises relevant in one setting are not relevant in another (Toulmin, 1958). This means that formal logic
is inappropriate in such settings - attributes such as level of interest, and argumention strength, constantly
change according to the group dynamics and goals and discourse norms of that specific interaction.
Moreover logic cannot accommodate the problem that there are different modes of argumentation
(causal, temporal, conditional, hypothetical), and that argumentation may be aimed at prescription,
prediction, explanation, appreciation, description, or classification (Brockriede, 1974).
Informal logic is the modern name given to the field of rhetoric and argumentation which attempts to
explain and critically evaluate everyday disputatious, adversarial, dialogical reasoning (Johnson, 1994).
Many very readable and useful books employ informal logic to enable their readers to develop more
persuasive and defensible reasoning (e.g. Fogelin, 1978; Flew, 1978; Thouless, 1968).
Everyday argumentation is based less on formal than on informal logic. Anderson (1990) has reviewed a
large number of studies showing that formal logic plays a small part in human reasoning processes.
Instead of using reasoning to manipulate a small number of logic rules (e.g. modus ponens as used in
syllogistic reasoning) people seem instead to use memory to retrieve one rhetorical rule from a large
number of rhetorical, context-dependent rules. Moreover, people aim for plausibility rather than accuracy
in their everyday reasoning (Isenberg, 1986: 241) and in organisations (Weick, 1995: 55-61). Rhetorical
rules have been extensively analysed and classified by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969).
Seibold et al., (1981) compared the two argumentation classification theories of Toulmin (1958) and
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) by using each one to develop coding schemes which were then
applied to discourse in decision making groups. The Toulmin classification helped to clarify the formal
structural elements, whereas the Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca classification helped to understand the
order in which statements were made, the persuasive effects intended, and the likely audiences targeted.
Normative use of argumentation research has included the development of sequential models of
argumentation. Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992) have suggested an idealised process model
involving four stages: the confrontation stage, where the dispute is externalised, the opening stage, in
which agreement is reached about the rules of discussion and initial common ground, the argumentation
stage where argumentation is exchanged and critically scrutinised, and finally the concluding stage where
the participants decide whose point of view is more forceful and convincing. Each stage requires a
different configuration of argumentation elements to enable the argument’s structure (premise, warrant,
qualifier, backing, rebuttal and claim) to be expressed and evaluated. Other normatively motivated stage
models of policy arguments include those by Scriven (1976), Hambrick (1974) and Gasper (1991). On the
other hand Ford & Ford (1995) have put forward a predictive model in the context of intra-organisational
conversations about change within organisations: they predict that each stage is characterised by
different sets of speech acts such as requests, orders, declarations and questions.
Such models have been heavilly influenced by linguistics research on the pragmatics of conversational
episodes. For example, Frentz (1976) suggested there are five episodes: (1) Initiation ("Hi Jim. How are
you?"), (2) Rule definition ("I’d like to talk to you for a few minutes", (3) Rule confirmation ("Okay, but
make it short. I have to get to a class"), (4) Strategic development ("I didn’t get the notes from the class
yesterday. Do you think I could borrow yours?", (5) Termination ("I guess I should let you get to your
class").
Research has identified various ways in which individuals reduce the threat of loss of "face". A person has
face to the extent that her presentation of self is accepted by others as a credible dramaturgical
face to the extent that her presentation of self is accepted by others as a credible dramaturgical
performance (Goffman, 1961). Negative politeness behaviour (Brown & Levinson, 1978), is motivated by
a desire by those of lower status to deviate from an efficient form of communicating in order to protect the
higher status, target person from being imposed on. It includes making elaborate apologies before
making requests, and indirect forms of language such as disguising assertions in the form of questions. It
gives rise to "powerless language", which is a form which has been found to make court witness’
evidence less convincing (Lind & O’Barr, 1979; O’Barr, 1982; Lakoff, 1975). Positive politeness
behaviour seeks to reassure the listener that she is being taken seriously in the interaction. One of the
contexts of its occurrence is when there is a difference of status. Those of higher status use informal (e.g.
"Hi" instead of "How do you do"), unassuming (e.g. "I do the hiring" rather than "I’m Personnel Director"),
self-mocking ("I get all the blame" rather than "I make all the decisions") or inclusive ("We" instead of "I")
language to reduce social distance and to reduce perceived dominance by leaders (Brown & Levinson,
1978).
Although influence attempts use three types of objectives for the speaker, involving instrumental, relational
and self-identity goals (Clark & Delia, 1979), the organizational literature has traditionally emphasised
instrumental objectives. In contrast, relational and self-identity goals are more relevant to influence
attempts which use a semantically indirect language form and style rather than a direct exchange-based
inducement as occurs when organisation members follow prescribed procedures in return for salaries and
other rewards. Various means are available to use language to sedate targets to overlook any leader-
follower or influencer-target inequity (Drake & Moberg, 1986). Semantic indirectness maintains the
meaning of the intended influence attempt but makes the fact that the attempt is being made invisible. It is
illustrated by transforming the direct "Do X" into "X needs to be done" (Sadock, 1974). Questions can be
sequenced to promote indirect influence (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975) by planting questions which cause the
target to consider a ‘pre-indexed’ proposition more favourably. Indirectness changes the role of the target
from obedient slave to sympathetic helper.
Argumentation provides a series of elements and sequences which may indicate that something is wrong
in a committee. Studies of the Challenger and Watergate disasters have shown that committee members
failed to question or challenge unwarranted assumptions and poor conclusions (Gouran, 1984, 1985,
1987; Gouran et al., 1986), did not base decisions upon factual evidence (Hirokawa & Pace, 1983), and
overlooked facts for opinions (Hirokawa, 1984). It is often assumed that because groups possess more
resources than individuals, they will be better able to make informed and good quality decisions.
However, this is often not the case. At the level of the group, argumentation is often not used effectively.
Meyers et al., reported on observations of group argumentation that
"group members typically did not reason through arguments beyond offering a claim and providing
some evidence...members seldom cited rules of logic or provided a standard whereby the argument
could be tested...Additionally, members appear to offer ample reinforcement to others’
proposals..but seldom offer objections or challenges .." (Meyers et al., 1991: 59-60).
The following section will now apply this argumentational approach to the study of power and conflict in
committees.
An illustration.
A new facility, due to be opened in January 1999, was being designed as a project within a large acute
hospital and involved it and several suppliers in a project consortium. The new facility involved an
experimental, politically sensitive approach to healthcare and required new working practices by staff. It
was to be located within the existing site and would eventually lead to a reduction in the size of the existing
hospital operation. It was therefore potentially threatening to existing staff. The project was studied by the
author’s research team over the three and a half year period January 1995 to July 1998. A committee
author’s research team over the three and a half year period January 1995 to July 1998. A committee
meeting was chosen from a large number attended and recorded by the author’s research team. The
meeting was selected on the basis of not containing sensitive information and not containing complex
technical material requiring over-long explanation. The study uses four information sources relevant to the
committee meeting.
Pre-committee report. A previously circulated report was analysed to discover its influence on the
committee meeting.
Pre-committee meeting. A private preparatory meeting of committee leaders a few hours before the
committee meeting was attended and a transcript taken in order to compare private and public reasons
and thus to deduce how much reason giving was suppressed in the committee.
Committee agenda. The agenda was compared with the committee meeting to see whether topics in the
committee meeting achieved the agenda objectives.
Committee meeting transcript. An extract was chosen from the start of the transcript until a sufficient
length for the extract to be able to provide an illustrative example of the concepts raised above. The
committee meeting analysed here was held in July 1996, some eighteen months after design work had
started.
The case illustrates how committee leaders, with the cooperation of other members, behave in a way
which maximises their power and minimises conflict. We formalise this behaviour in the form of a model
and illustrate our model by showing the operation of a number of rules which leaders and their followers
used. Our analysis of the case explains why committees do not follow the Dewey model of rationalistic
argumentation and deliberation and why politeness, passive acceptance, and tactical non-disclosure play
such an important part in committee functioning. It provides linguistic measures of power, conflict and
accountability. It provides quantitative measures combined with a qualitative, evaluative methodology.
 Figure 1. Model of linguistic power and conflict in committees.
Methodology.
The extract was analysed in order to discover the frequency of occurrence and linguistic style of various
elements of argumentation such as questions and answers, evidence and proposals, and challenges and
rebuttals to discover the level of conflict and the extent to which it is avoided. This also included an
analysis of topic shifting. The coding scheme was influenced by the Toulmin (1958) categories of premise
and warrant (both contained here as Reasons) and claim (Proposals here), and the Canary et al., (1987)
categories of challenges and objections (both contained in Challenges here) and convergent arguments
(called Supports here), and responses (here Rebuttals). Questions and Answers as argumentational
devices have been influenced by Sillince (1998) and the categories related to topic management are
influenced by Sillince (1995).
The coding rules were as follows: Attributions of meaning were limited to the text. If there was more than
one occurrence of the same element in any turn then it was treated as separate occurrence of that
element. Turn numbers were used to indicate whose turn an element occurred in. Line numbers were used
to indicate the associated text.
Reliability was tested in the following way. A second coder and the author coded the transcript. Cohen’s
kappa (Cohen, 1960) provides an estimate of intercoder agreement beyond what would be expected to
happen with chance selections. Two separate formulae were used, one for both coding variables and
position in text (line numbers) (k = .65) and one for occurrence of coding variables in each turn (k = .71).
These agreements are beyond chance and so they were considered acceptable.
These agreements are beyond chance and so they were considered acceptable.
The argumentation elements are defined in the coding scheme given in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Coding scheme.
An extract from the transcript and the coding operation are shown in Figure 3.
 Figure 3. Coding of extract from committee meeting transcript.
Rule 1. Select argumentation elements.
Words (W) and Turns (T). Floor time is the amount of time the speaker controls the discourse with her
own speech (Hayashi, 1991; Edelsky, 1981; Shultz et.al., 1982). More powerful individuals have been
observed to take up more floor time in interactions (Schwartz, 1977). Floor time is indicated by the
number of words. Although the chairman of the committee was the Chief Executive, the member with the
most floor time was the Director of Contracting. These two members had more floor time than all the
others put together.
Questions (Q) and Answers (A). Asking questions is a language use which is more "powerless" than
giving answers. There were 4 answers to the 8 questions. The Director of Contracts and the Chief
Executive provided answers while the others asked questions – another indicator of the power of these
two individuals. The low power of other members was reflected in the fact that 4 questions received no
answer, in turns [11], [17], [18], and [26]; they were ignored as other members interrupted – a sign of their
lower power and status (West, 1984; Tannen, 1993)
Challenges (C) and Rebuttals (Re). Challenges are utterances which attack a previous turn. Challenges
either imply something absurd (e.g. "does this mean that you build a facility and then fit the purpose into
it later?" in [3]), or two sentences containing a contradiction (e.g. "these do not find mention" in [14]) or
contain a preposition indicating contradiction ("but", "although", "except", "unless").
Challenges are a sign of conflict. Evidence of conflict was rare – there were only 4 challenges. The
Clinical Director Imaging was the most critical, with two challenges. The first of these was in turn [3], which
attacked turn [2]. In turn [2] the Director of Contracts had suggested postponement of the Master Contract
without any previous agreement. Turn [3] challenged this. This was interpreted by the Chief Executive in
turn [4] as a blaming inference – that there was no leadership – and so the blame was laid at the door of
the Outpatients Department. The second challenge was "Those figures don’t feel right." in [21], another
example of a negative politeness strategy (the challenge is softened, because it could have been "These
figures are wrong!"). This softened challenge attacked turn [20] and received a direct rebuttal from the
Director of Contracting – (Laughs) "It’s from you!" in [22]. The humour is an example of an intention to
reduce social distance and is a sign that the initiating individual is of higher power and status (Coser,
1959). Social distance is the similarity of people in terms of social characteristics, and is expressed in
language (Drake & Moberg, 1986). For example, similarity or membership of a group are associated with
markers, which include familiar address, exaggerated statements, and a casual and colloquial style of
speech (Brown & Levinson, 1978). An intention to reduce social distance is usually initiated by the higher
status person (Fishman, 1971) – as was the case here ("It’s from you!" was said by the Director of
Contracting).
Supports (S). Supports are in-topic turns which support a previous turn. There were only 2 supporting
contributions. [9] supports [8] and [10] supports [9]. These were made by the Chief Executive and the
Director of Contracts. The lack of supports may suggest the early stage in the project so that the
committee had not yet bonded (Tuckman, 1965). The Chief Executive’s "Only two or three people will
committee had not yet bonded (Tuckman, 1965). The Chief Executive’s "Only two or three people will
question the data" was a positive politeness strategy because it created an atmosphere of complicity and
in-group solidarity by sharing privileged information about outsiders. The various occurrences of "we" and
"our" had the effect of claiming common views and purposes (Cheney, 1983) - it is significant that of a
total of 14 occurrences, 11 were by either the Chief Executive or the Director of Contracting, whereas only
1 of the 5 occurrences of "I" and "you" were used by them.
Reasons (R) and Proposals (P). A proposal is defined as a claim or a recommendation, whereas a
reason is defined as a fact or rule which is used to imply a proposal. A proposal might be descriptive
("We have 8 weeks"), predictive ("two or three people will question the data"), or prescriptive ("we should
postpone"). There were much fewer reasons (8 cases) than there were proposals (24 cases) so that the
great majority of proposals were made without any reasons to back them up. The majority of proposals
(17) were given by the Chief Executive and the Director of Contracting. Reasons were usually offered in
those turns where something contentious was being said.
Reasons included evidence or facts which were used to imply a proposition or proposal. For example, in
turn [12], the evidence was "Recovery times will come down" which justified the proposal "That’s where
we need scheduling". And in turn [4], the evidence was "Outpatients can’t decide how much of
outpatients work should go into [the new facility]" and the proposal this implied was "So the building
should be flexible enough to accommodate our needs". The adverb "So" has a crucial function here and
other similar markers are other adverbs (e.g. "then"), prepositions (e.g. "till", "but"), demonstrative
pronouns with relational adverbs (e.g. "That’s where") and conjunctions ("because", "if") (Lauerbach,
1989; Jucker, 1993; Konig, 1991).
Reasons are required when an influence attempt is resisted and the action challenged (Drake & Moberg,
1986). Such reasons are expected whenever people fall below some accepted norm of expectations
(Scott & Lyman, 1968). Also, expressive reasons with casual references to common knowledge indicate
more social intimacy than ones where all the background information is given explicitly (Scott & Lyman,
1968). The common knowledge in this case was the 10 page report ("Type and Volume of Activity")
written by the Director of Contracting and circulated 2 days before the committee meeting. It made
recommendations using detailed quantitative projections supplied by a consultant. It advised that theatre
caseload planning and scheduling (due to be taken out of the hands of doctors and to be given to an
administrator using special software) should be based on recovery time. It suggested four key criteria for
selecting those main hospital specialties to include in the new facility. Although the report is explicitly
referred to only twice in the meeting, it lay behind a number of statements made and thus increased the
legitimate power (French & Raven , 1968) of its author, the Director of Contracting. It generated questions
(in turns [5] and [15]), was referred to in an answer (in turn [6]: "We have 8 weeks" – a deadline), was
referred to as relevant to the imminent consultation process (in turn [10]), was used as a reason (in turns
[4]: "Outpatients can’t decide" – an excuse, [12]: "in terms of savings" – a common goal, and [25]: "lots of
investigation and intervention" – a criterion for including specialties), and was criticised (in turns [13] and
[14]).
As previously mentioned, there were only 8 reasons and 24 proposals in the committee meeting. Are
reasons avoided in forums which are very public? To answer this we analysed two other meetings – the
pre-committee private meeting, and a public meeting at which consultants expressed their anger at the
proposals. For the first meeting we would expect a higher proportion of reasons, and for the second a
lower proportion. For the pre-committee private meeting there was, as expected, a slightly higher
proportion of reasons to proposals in the pre-committee meeting - 31 proposals and 14 reasons, which is
slight evidence for this. But for the public meeting, contrary to expectation, the proportion (25 proposals
and 8 reasons) was the same as in the committee meeting.
New Topics (NT). There were 8 new topics, although some of them were simply repeated attempts to
New Topics (NT). There were 8 new topics, although some of them were simply repeated attempts to
return to an earlier topic. New topics are usually marked pragmatically by topic shift markers or 'frame
words' (Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975) which exist for signalling changes in topic. They were either
pragmatically marked by interrogative forms ("What..?"," How..?", "Will the…?", in 7 cases) or
exceptionally (1 case) by a contradiction to indicate a challenge ("There’s a lot of…But these do not…").
All new topics were raised by members other than the Chief Executive and the Director of Contracting.
Repeated Efforts to raise a topic (RE). 2 topics were the subject of repeated efforts to raise them.
Making repeated efforts to raise a topic was an indication of low power because it showed that someone
was failing to get the topic adequately discussed. These repeated efforts were made by members other
than the Chief Executive or the Director of Contracts.
Topic Avoidance (TA). When someone avoids a difficult issue which had been previously raised, they
are having an important effect on the course of the discussion. So this is an indicator of power. It is
commonly assumed that many elements are either accepted as tacitly assumed or jointly created by
dialogue participants in order to facilitate dialogue. This assumption of collaboration is problematic in
argumentation. In non-argumentational discourse it is assumed that focus and scope shifts are negotiated
in good faith, so that surprising or cognitively taxing shifts are less acceptable. To be coherent, discourse
needs processes which both 'unfold' (a theme emerges over time) and 'bind' previously unrelated
elements together by means of referential activity (Bamberg & Marchman, 1991) and of categorisation of
temporal flow of events (Slobin, 1990). In argumentation, however, partners may find that surprise, deceit,
distraction and complexity are useful weapons.
Topic Widening (TW). Topic widening occurs when a previously raised topic is expanded. For example,
turn [5] raises the question of what constitutes a consultation for the purposes of the new facility, and turn
[6] widens the topic by making the answer dependent upon the utilisation rate of equipment, which
depends on diagnosis as well as on consultation. Topic widening influences what is said and so is an
indicator of power. Figure 4 shows that the Director of Contracts avoided a topic twice, and that all but
one of the topic widening turns were those of the Chief Executive or the Director of Contracting.
Figure 4. Statistics of committee argumentation.
Rule 2. Maximise linguistic power.
This is the power accruing to the speaker from their use of language. It is distinct from positional power -
the power that goes with a job title. It is a composite variable. On seven measures – floor time, questions
and answers, challenges and rebuttals, proposals and topic shifts, the committee was divided into two
camps, which could be loosely termed the leaders – those with positional power - (the Director of
Contracting and the Chief Executive) and the followers (the rest). Leaders had more floor time (a potential
source of referent power – French & Raven, 1968) than followers despite their being numerically fewer in
number.
Leaders gave answers (A) to questions (Q) posed by followers; leaders gave rebuttals (Re) to challenges
(C) made by followers; leaders made more proposals (P) than followers; leaders supported (S) each
other; – all ways in which leaders could demonstrate their special knowledge and expertise and hence
increase their perceived expert power (French & Raven, 1968). New topics were always raised by
followers, although their relatively low power was reflected in several repeated attempts to raise the same
topic. Sometimes topics were avoided (TA) or widened (TW), and this was done solely by leaders. This
source of power is one which cannot easily be fitted into the French & Raven (1968) framework.. This
discussion suggests that the linguistic power of individual j can be defined as:
 (1)
 (1)
We hypothesise that linguistic power as defined above is associated with floor time (W).
Rule 3. Minimise linguistic accountability.
Speakers commit themselves to rhetorical positions and thereby increase their responsibility (for a
decision) and liability to blame. Linguistic accountability is increased by making proposals (P), giving
answers (A), and giving reasons (R), (they all make one a target for later blaming) and is reduced by
avoiding (TA) and widening topics (TW) and asking questions (Q). One way of exerting power without
disempowering one’s subordinates is to avoid accountability by asking questions (e.g. Jack Welch, the
chief executive of General Electric frequently uses this form of influence). This discussion suggests that
the linguistic accountability of individual j can be defined as:
 (2)
We hypothesise that individuals attempt to maximise their Power (influence) and to minimise their
Accountability (liability to blame) and hence that these two variables will be negatively associated.
Rule 4. Minimise linguistic conflict.
Conflict is the extent to which interaction focuses on disagreement. Challenges (C) threaten face directly,
obliging the challengee to repair or retract ("That’s rubbish - I don’t agree"). Reasons (R) offer a target for
later challenge. Rebuttals (Re) continue the disagreement episode. On the other hand, proposals (P) are
positive and serve a constructive function, inviting further contributions and creating an atmosphere of
agreement. Supports (S) are explicit agreements with previous proposals. This suggests a definition of
committee conflict over i instances of argumentation elements for each of j individuals is:
 (3)
Conflict was calculated for the committee meeting (Conflict =  from Figure 4) and for the public
meeting at which hospital consultants expressed their anger at the proposed new unit (Conflict =  from
Figure 5). The source transcript for Figure 7 is not included for space reasons.
 Figure 5. Statistics of public meeting argumentation.
The similar level of conflict does not adequately reflect the different emotional atmosphere between the
two meetings. However, this is not the point – the definition of conflict here is an argumentation one, rather
than an emotional one.
Rule 5. Use negative and positive politeness.
Conflict was managed and contained by the use of both positive and negative politeness. Politeness rules
are a means of palliating influence attempts (Drake & Moberg, 1986: 574) and hence aim at reducing
conflict. An analysis of linguistic forms shows their complex and subtle role in argumentation in
determining the way in which argumentation was expressed to take account of relative power. Leaders
initiated positive politeness forms of "powerful" language, whereas followers initiated negative politeness
forms of "powerless" language.
(a) Negative politeness. Requests were elaborately justified (e.g. [15]: "I’m curious to know if…").
Disquiet gave rise to questions rather than to challenges (e.g. [3]: "you fit the purpose into it later?").
Assertions were transformed into questions (e.g. [26]: "we might need a facility for classes and other
activities?"), or linguistic means were used to neutralise the emotional force of criticism (e.g. [3]: "But
does this mean.."). When questions were not sufficiently answered and disquiet persisted, as it did over
the definition of a clinical consultation, they were asked again and again ([5], [11], [18]) rather than turning
them into explicit challenges due either to deference to leaders (Mullen et al., 1991), or to evaluation
apprehension - the worry about what others think – (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). Argumentation was rare -
there were much fewer reasons than there were proposals and the great majority of proposals were made
without any reasons to back them up. In terms of strategies for exercising power (Falbo, 1977) hinting,
persistence and evasion were more frequently used than reason. Because reasons are an invitation to
challenge, a conflict avoidance principle is to offer reasons only where necessary – that is - where
something potentially contentious was being said. Challenges can operate to neutralize the power of
leaders and thus paralyze, destroy or counteract the effectiveness of leader behaviours (Kerr, 1977). It is
not surprising therefore that there were few challenges.
(b) Positive politeness. Leaders embedded talk with references to shared objectives and thus reduced
social distance between themselves and their followers. Leaders increased followers’ sense of complicit
membership (reducing the perceived distance between followers and leaders) by embedding references
to shared objectives in their talk: "We need to have discussions..", "We should send details..", "We can
get more out of it in terms of savings..", and "We need to change peoples’ views". They made 10 such
references (in proposals) to followers’ 3 references (in questions). Rationality became socially
constructed to mean the necessity of having discussions, saving money, and changing peoples’ views.
This suggests that the purpose of the process was as much about the creation of commitment as it was to
ensure a high quality decision outcome. Indeed, it has been found that a low-quality solution that has good
group commitment can be more effective than a high-quality solution that lacks such commitment (Maier,
1967). This function of ensuring collective commitment is more important when objectives are more
ambiguous, and may explain why higher level managers tend to share more power than lower level
managers (Heller & Wilpert, 1981).
The Director of Contracts regarded answers as means of introducing disclaimers. Disclaimers are means
whereby an influencer can reduce any dissatisfaction which targets may feel with regard to face-threats
associated with compliance (Drake & Moberg, 1986). 2 of his 3 answers were equivocal ("That depends"
in [6] and in [16]). They were means of adjusting a potentially overbearing identity and instead
demonstrating tentativeness rather than dogmatism, and concern for others’ opinions.
Also, comparison of the pre-committee meeting and committee transcript reveals other forms of
politeness. Firstly the Trust concealed knowledge of the supplier’s anxiety as a form of positive politeness
(revealing it would have slightly humiliated the supplier, making him appear to be begging). Secondly the
supplier asked for commitment indirectly as a form of negative politeness (a direct plea might have led to
an embarrassing rejection).
an embarrassing rejection).
Rule 6. Use Tactical non-disclosure.
All formal meetings such as committees have preparatory talks between smaller groups of insiders or
"kitchen cabinet" colleagues. The committee meeting was no exception. A pre-committee meeting (at
which the author was able to record and take a transcript) was held between the Director of Contracting
and the Chairman of the hospital Trust. The comparison of public argumentation in the committee
meeting, with private argumentation in the pre-committee meeting, enables us to compare foreground
disclosure with background concealment, and to explore the reasons why a situation is equivocal (has
many meanings) (Weick, 1995: 92) .
The public argumentation was presented at the committee meeting. In turn [1], the Manager [Facilities
Management Supplier] asked what the new facility meant for the Trust’s strategy. Although he did not
make this explicit, he was seeking commitment by the Trust to his company’s involvement in the
Consortium’s project. He was answered (in turn [2]) by the Director of Contracting’s proposal that the
contract signing be postponed until March or April 1997, with the reason that this would give the
information systems requirements time to be written. However, this was different from what he had said to
the Chairman in a private meeting earlier that day.
The private argumentation was presented at the pre-committee meeting. Besides the uncertainty about
the information system, a privately held reason for favouring postponement was to get the latest
technology. The Trust concealed its aim to get the latest technology as a negotiating tactic – a form of
"keeping its powder dry" or "keeping its cards close to its chest" (disclosure would have given a reason to
the supplier to charge a higher price). The committee was not the right place to hold negotiations
(Edelman, 1966). It did not accept the levels of conflict required for negotiation. In withholding the
ammunition of reasons, the Trust preserved its power.
Rule 7. Ensure Passive Acceptance of Agenda
The passive acceptance and failure to challenge by followers is clearly demonstrated in the relation of the
agenda to the committee meeting. The agenda contained three objectives. Each agenda objective will be
treated separately.
1. To "endorse" the view that the "key driver" (influencing information systems design and working
practices design) was the building design work. The discussion on this item is contained in turns [1]
to [4], consisting of a question, followed by an answer, followed by a challenge, followed by a
rebuttal. The answer and rebuttal were from the Director of Contracting and the Chief Executive. So
this endorsement (by others) did not happen explicitly – nobody apart from these two individuals
supported the objective. However, because there was no successful, open challenge the agenda
objective was achieved.
2. To "identify" key project milestones for the building work. One milestone ("We have eight weeks to
make decisions about how much of each department goes into the facility" in turn [6]) was
introduced without any reasons by the Director of Contracting to back up his point that targets on
utilisation rate were needed. This amounted to a "leader" feeding the committee with conclusions he
wished it to accept. Another set of milestones is contained in the Director of Contracting’s answers
in turns [9], [12], and [20]. The agenda objective was for the committee to do the identifying. Instead
the Director of Contracting did it, and lack of discussion or challenge constituted a legitimation.
3. To "actively consider" the size and scope of work in the new facility. The key issue here was whether
or not consultations should be done in the new facility. Page 6 of the report by the Director of
Contracting circulated before the committee meeting raised doubts on their inclusion. On this very
Contracting circulated before the committee meeting raised doubts on their inclusion. On this very
point there were repeated questions in the committee about what was meant by "consultation" from
followers and deflection by means of avoidance and widening of topic by leaders.
The achievement of the agenda objectives must be accepted because later committee meetings did not
question their achievement. The fact that they were achieved throws an interesting light on concepts such
as "endorsement", "identification" and "consideration" by committee and its enactment function as a
means of increasing leaders’ legitimate power (French & Raven, 1968). The success of this process is
due to enactment as a prelude to internalisation (Weick, 1995), and the fact that rationality is socially
constructed in daily practical activities so that enactment is used to legitimise what has occurred
(Garfinkel, 1967; Neilsen & Rao, 1987). Having been in a committee at which they did not voice their
serious criticisms (negative politeness acted as an incentive to them to engage in counter-attitudinal
behaviour) meant that followers later sought to reduce cognitive dissonance and reconcile their views with
the committee positions they had passively accepted. As far as cognitive dissonance theory is
concerned, empirical evidence (O’Keefe, 1990: 61-76) suggests that the size of the incentive is negatively
associated with the extent of the attitude change. This implies that when people are aware that they are
being forced (by an incentive) to comply, then they remain aloof from changing their beliefs, but when the
incentive is imperceptibly small (such as a taken for granted negative politeness convention) they come to
look on the adopted beliefs as their own. Followers considered themselves implicated in the committee’s
work. When new topics arose, members took note of what the "agreed" position was on the previous
topic. If a topic’s central proposal was not challenged, then this was taken to be the accepted position.
This is a form of 'membershipping', whereby argumentational positions come to be "owned" by meeting
participants (Sacks, 1972). Silent and perhaps reluctant acceptance is in this way transformed into
deliberate choice and is used by leaders to legitimate the committee’s work.
Statistical tests.
The source data for the statistical tests is in Figures 4 and 5 above. The two data sources provide 16
observations (individuals who contributed to either meeting). The variables which are significantly
associated (using a two-tailed test with Spearman rank correlation scores greater than 
) are Power and Accountability ( ), floor time (W) and Power (
), floor time (W) and Accountability ( ), Reasons (R) and Accountability ( )
and Proposals (P) and Power ( ).
However, insignificant or negative associations exist for Questions (Q) and Power ( ),
Challenges (C) and Power ( ), Challenges (C) and Accountability ( ) and Reasons
(R) and Power ( ).
The association of Power and Accountability was unexpected because it was hypothesised earlier than
individuals will seek to maximise Power and minimise Accountability. Otherwise, apart from the
associations of floor time (W) with Power and Accountability hypothesised above, these significant
associations are determined by the definitions of Power (in which Proposals is numerically the major
variable) and Accountability (in which Reasons is numerically the major variable) and so are no surprise.
Also, several of the variables for which small numbers of observations exist in the data remain
unvalidated.
Defining power.
Our model has implications for the five definitions of power developed earlier. It assumes that the
expression of reasons is minimised, and that norms of conflict reduction mean that were zero sum power
expression of reasons is minimised, and that norms of conflict reduction mean that were zero sum power
to be exercised in committees in open disputes, and were some members to take a zero sum view, then
they would find their efforts to be counterproductive. Committee power is not about winning arguments.
Also our model assumes that the important argumentation has already been aired so that processual
power is used in other forums - in private meetings, negotiations, or in reports. In terms of organisational
power, leaders were able to understand the roles of other members of the committee (e.g. concern at
meeting their project responsibilities, concern at representing their specialties’ interests, general clinical
and ethical worries, and the supplier’s concern at promoting his company’s profits). In our model, these
role-based interests led to power-related language forms of influence attempt (e.g. leaders controlled the
hospital and the project and this led to their choice of positive politeness strategies). In terms of the
structurally-constrained definition of power, leaders were able to understand the way in which societal
actors behave (power relationships within hospitals and within consortiums, between hospitals and their
customers, and between government and the healthcare sector). The socially-constructed definition of
power has the most relevance to our model. In our model (Figure 1), leaders attempted to reduce
linguistic conflict and maximise linguistic power by balancing argumentation variables (equations 1 & 2)
and by making use of followers’ passive acceptance. The clearest evidence of such power in the case
studied was the fact that, although they had only passively accepted the ideas of committee leaders,
followers did not question those ideas during the remaining two years of the study. The ideas had been
legitimated and thus taken for granted. These various definitions of power suggest a typology as shown in
Figure 6.
Figure 6. Type of power and definition of power within committees
Future directions.
We suggest a research agenda along the following lines. Firstly, there is a potential for quantitative testing
of the current hypotheses and validation of the coding scheme over larger numbers and types of meetings.
The extent of conflict and argumentation in committees will vary, related to the need for wide debate and
challenge of decisions. It has been suggested that larger firms in uncertain environments need dissent
while smaller firms in certain environments need consensus (Cosier & Schwenk, 1990, 70). There may
also be a consistent difference between projects (with their need for commitment to tight budgets and
deadlines) and organisations. If committee members fail to agree about objectives and perceived causal
relationships, then more political forms of organisation will become appropriate (Thompson & Tuden,
1959) and this will require inclusion of political variables in any analysis.
The definition of conflict in equation 3 was a committee-level definition, whereas power and accountability
are defined in equations 1 and 2 at the level of the individual. What is the precise relationship between
conflict and power at this aggregate level? Situations of high conflict are encouraged when leaders have
little power and are therefore unable to control, avoid and widen topics (equation 2). This suggests the
falsifiable hypothesis that large disparities in individual power between committee members are
associated with lower levels of conflict. The association between power and accountability, observed
above and falsifying our hypothesis that they were negatively related, requires further analysis.
Conclusion.
The model differs widely from the rationalist models of group decision making put forward by the
functionalist approach to communication in groups. The model also shows the close relation between
power and the ability to minimise conflict. Although studies of persuasion in management has tended to
remain unfocussed at the general organisational level, the model is able to relate participants’ roles within
the committee and the seven rules and so is able to focus upon a specific context – the committee.
Another implication of the model is its illuminating relevance for the question of why the various processes
of argumentation are not usually followed. The data and the methodology have both been original, bringing
methods and theories from linguistics and philosophy into the management literature. In particular, they
methods and theories from linguistics and philosophy into the management literature. In particular, they
successfully relate a qualitative methodology to quantitative data analysis by means of inter-coder
reliability checks and non-parametric statistical tests.
The model assumes that leaders (1) aim to create and maintain a cooperative atmosphere; (2) use
positive politeness language forms to protect followers (the powerless) from a sense of loss of respect,
approval or intimacy; (3) use language which reduces social distance and followers’ perceptions of
leaders’ dominance; (4) avoid challenges and reason-giving; and (5) direct the choice of topic by means
of topic avoidance and topic widening.
The model assumes that followers consider themselves implicated in the committee’s work even when
they have only passively accepted it by failing to raise challenges. Leaders increase this sense of
complicity by embedding references to shared objectives in their talk. Followers express their disquiet in
weakened form as questions, which is a negative form of politeness aimed at reducing leaders’ sense of
being imposed upon by their criticisms. A model of the relationship between power and conflict is
suggested in which (a) politeness rules that acknowledge power differences reduce conflict; and (b)
norms of the unacceptability of conflict lead to the open expression of power being hidden (by reasons not
being disclosed).
Answering questions, supporting others, making proposals, rebutting challenges, avoiding and widening
topics, and achieving the agenda’s objectives are means by which leaders increase their power. This
undoubted source of power cannot be accommodated within the French & Raven (1968) typology. It is the
power that comes from an ability to handle ambiguous situations and in particular the potential conflicts
arising from argumentation, which is an ability to "absorb, or resolve and utilize, conflict for personal and
organizational ends" (Dalton, 1959). Our model assumes, and our example illustrates, that conflict is
perceived as damaging for individuals and the organisation, so that those who are able to oil the wheels
by managing and containing conflict while still achieving important managerial goals are accorded extra
legitimation by others.
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Figure 1. Model of linguistic power and conflict in committees. (return)

Figure 2. Coding scheme. (return)
Floor time (F) Floor time is number of words spoken in a turn.
Reasons (R) A reason is a fact or rule which is used to imply a proposal.
Proposals (P) A proposal is a claim that something is true or recommendation that
something should happen.
Questions (Q) Questions are sentences in the interrogative form of verb – subject.
Answers (A) Answers are in-topic turns which follow questions.
Challenges (C) Challenges are sentences which attack a previous turn.
Rebuttals (Re) Rebuttals are in-topic turns which attack previous challenges.
Supports (S) Supports are in-topic turns which support a previous turn.
New topics (NT) New topics are turns in which there is a change of subject.
Repeated efforts to raise same topic (RE) Repetition occurs when the same topic is
returned to after an interval of time in which other topics have been raised. A repeated attempt
is when the topic is not continued.
Topic avoidance (TA) If a turn raises a new topic but pretends to continue the previous topic
this is topic avoidance.
Topic widening (TW) Topic widening occurs when a previously raised topic is expanded.
Figure 3. Coding of extract from committee meeting transcript. (return)
Note + For coding scheme see Figure 2.
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March or April next year
Till then all [names the NHS
Trust] facilities like information
systems will have time to decide
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you construct the building and
then let the facilities and
departments take over later
But does this mean that you
build a facility and then that you













Outpatients can’t decide how
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should go into [the new facility]













What exactly is the nature of a
consultation? Do we know?
(Q 20-21)
(NT 20)












That depends on the utilisation
rate
We want a utilisation rate for
Radiology of 80 to 90 percent
(20 percent would not be
economic)
We have 8 weeks to make
decisions about how much of
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discussions with individuals and
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We should send details of all
this now to all clinical leads and
consultants
We should ask for comments in
two weeks and then have a big
meeting to agree
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question the data used by
[name of the Director of






















There will be beds in the hotel
twenty of them plus ten for
elderly and rehabilitation cases












If we pump in more work into [the
new facility] we can get more out
of it in terms of savings for
example Pediatrics the more
the work
the more the opportunity to save
Recovery times will be coming
down from 10-12 hours to 45
minutes
That’s where we need












To schedule certain kinds of
activities together may not be a
good thing
Some specialties cannot stand
each other we need to change













There’s a lot of medical
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But these do not find mention in
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we might need a facility for
classes and other activities?
(Q 87-88)
Figure 4. Statistics of committee argumentation. (return)
Note: * denotes leaders; others were followers.
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Figure 5. Statistics of public meeting argumentation. (return)
Note: * denotes leaders; others were followers
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